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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 782a-3(2) (g) as this is an appeal from a final judgment and
order in a domestic relations action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce
entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon
County, State of Utah.
The case at bar was tried before the Honorable
Boyd Bunnell on the 14th and 15th days of September,
1989. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision(Addendum
A)

on

September

28,

1989.

Two

motions

requesting

supplemental decisions were filed concerning property and
support issues which are not material to the current
appeal. Following the Court's rulings on those motions,
Defendant/Appellant

filed objections to the proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. After minor
modifications, the Court entered its Findings of Fact
(hereafter "FF"), Conclusions of Law, and Decree of
Divorce

on

January

10,

1990,

(Addendum

B) .

Defendant/Appellant filed Notice of Appeal in the present
case on February 6, 1990.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent offers the following statement of
relevant facts in the present case:
(a)

Akbar Tizpa was born and raised in Iran

as the only son of wealthy Iranian parents who still
reside in and are citizens of that country (TT 334-362) .
(b)
in

1969

to

Mr. Tizpa was sent to the United States
obtain

a

college

education;

and,

after

spending some time in Los Angeles, he moved to Price,
Utah to attend the College of Eastern Utah (TT 344-3 62) .
(c)
who

was

a

While attending CEU, Mr. Tizpa met Tauna,

high

school

student

at

that

time,

and

subsequently married her on June 29, 1974 (FF 2; RA 144) .
(d)

The couple continued to reside in Utah

while Mr. Tizpa

finished

his

education.

In

1976

he

relocated the family back to Iran where they lived for
approximately four years until the Iranian revolution (TT
344-363).
(e)

Fleeing from the revolution, the family

came back to Price, Utah at the end of 1979, and Mr.
Tizpa commenced employment with Utah Power and Light. He
also opened Akbar's Karate Studio where, as an expert in
marshal1

arts,

he

continues
2

to

instruct,

not

only

numerous students, but police officers as well. (TT 386,
433; OTSC 22). His employment has occupied much of his
time, leaving little time to devote to the children (FF
6C) .
(f)

Mr. Tizpa stipulated that throughout the

marriage until January, 1989, Mrs. Tizpa was a "wonderful
mother" and the primary caretaker of the four children
born to this marriage. (Stipulated fact TT 119; FF 6B,
RA 144).
(g)

Mr. Tizpa's testimony at both the Order

to Show Cause Hearing and the Trial displayed a dramatic
cultural gender-bias concerning the role of women and the
husband's right to totally control his family. (OTSC 123180; TT 344-428).
(h)

Mrs. Tizpa testified to a married life of

constant, continual, and complete domination by Mr. Tizpa
of every aspect of her life and the lives of her children
(TT 202-212, OTSC 70-79). A domination that was enforced
by fear and intimidation (TT 336-338).
(i)

Mrs.

Tizpa

testified

that

the

only

"acceptable" companions she had were her mother and her
children and their friends (OTSC 70-76).
(j)

In January, 1989 Mrs. Tizp

3

ntered into

a sexual relationship with 16 year old Ryan McGavin, the
older brother of a friend of the parties' daughter
Careshmeh. The relationship was short-lived and by the
time of trial, the relationship had ended (OTSC 3-6, TT
275-276, 462).
(k)

Mrs.

Tizpa

admitted

herself

to

the

Castleview Hospital Stress Unit in mid-January, 1989 for
a period of five days and then filed for divorce on
February 15, 1989 (OTSC 3-4).
(1)
the

In January, 1989, Mr. Tizpa withdrew all

substantial

joint

marital

savings

accounts

and

removed Mrs. Tizpa's name from all funds (TT 172-173).
The only funds left available to Mrs. Tizpa consisted of
comparatively small amounts in the children's savings
accounts (TT 174).
(m)

The parties were granted an Order to Show

Cause Hearing for temporary custody and other related
issues, which was scheduled as a special full-day setting
before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge.
The Court received testimony from eight witnesses and,
after taking the matter under advisement, the Court
entered an Order dated April 24, 1989, granting temporary
custody of the three girls to Mrs. Tizpa and granting
4

custody of the parties' son to Mr. Tizpa. The Order also
restrained Mrs. Tizpa from associating with Ryan McGavin
in the presence of her children (Order RA 84, Addendum
C).
(n)

On September 14th and 15th, 1989, trial

was held and Judge Bunnell received the testimony of
nineteen (19) witnesses and numerous exhibits (TT cover
and index). The judge entered a Memorandum Decision
(Addendum A) ; and, after several motions and supplemental
decisions not relevant to this appeal, the Court entered
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce on January 10, 1990 (Addendum B).
(o)

The Court found that it was in the best

interests of the children that the three daughters remain
with Mrs. Tizpa and the parties' son remain with Mr.
Tizpa. The Court entered specific findings concerning
many factors which lead to that result (FF 6A-M; RA 144149; Addendum B).
(p)

Defendant/Appellant Mr. Tizpa filed Notice

of the current appeal on February 6, 1990

5

(Addendum C).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent contends that the correct standard
of review in equitable cases is stated in Rule 52(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the line of cases
decided after the modification of that rule in 1987. That
standard

requires the Appellate

Court to weigh the

sufficiency of the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and
Findings of Fact in light of the evidence presented at
trial and to sustain those Findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.
Respondent contends that Appellant has failed
to meet his burden on appeal because: (1) he has not
marshalled all the evidence in support of the Trial
Court's Findings, and (2) he has not demonstrated that
despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence.
Finally, Respondent contends that the Trial
Court applied the appropriate standards in evaluating its
custody award and entered specific Findings of Fact which
are supported by substantial evidence which is in the
record and those Findings should not be reversed.
6

ARGUMENT
I
PURSUANT TO THE MODIFICATION OF RULE 52 (a) , UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT
SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE UNLESS THEY ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
The Trial Court's numerous and express Findings
of Fact in the case at bar should be reviewed in light
of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
Rule 52: Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury..., the
court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon, and judgment shall
be
entered
pursuant
to
Rule
58A;...Findings of Fact, whether
based
on
oral
or
documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to
judge
the
credibility
of the
witnesses. The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts
them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated
orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence
or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court...
[Emphasis added by O^der of the Utah
Supreme Court on Oc* er 30, 1986 and
became effective on ^nuary 1, 1987. ]
7

An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule
52(a) demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the
facts of the case at the appellate level. Because this
is an equitable case, Appellant urges this Court to "make
its own findings and substitute its judgment for that of
the Trial Court." (App. Brief p.8). As support for that
position, Appellant offers Mitchell v. Mitchell. 527 P.2d
1359 (Utah 1974) and Wiese v. Wiese. 469 P.2d 504 (Utah
1970) , cases decided many years prior to the modification
of Rule 52(a). That position is not consistent with
either Rule 52(a) or the more recent line of cases
clarifying the standard of appellate review. In Riche v.
Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989), an equitable case,
this Court stated:
Husband, in his brief on appeal,
refers this court to evidence which
conflicts with the trial court's
findings and supports his contention
that he should have been awarded
custody of the four children.
However, Husband does not "marshal
the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be *against the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making
them *clearly erroneous.'" Bartell,
776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker. 743
P.2d at 193) . See also Scharf v. BMG
Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985); Harker v. Condominiums Forest
8

Glen. Inc. . 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) . Therefore, we decline
to further consider Husband's attack
on the court's findings as to
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468).
In Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985),
an equitable case, the Supreme Court has also expressly
provided:
On appeal from a judgment of the
Trial Court, our [Appellate Court]
role is not to substitute our own
findings for those of the Trial
Court, but to examine the record for
evidence supporting the judgment.
(Shioii, supra, at 201.)
[Emphasis added]
Given that express statement of the role of the
Appellate

Court,

Appellant

is

charged

with

the

responsibility of (1) marshalling all the evidence in
support of the findings, and

(2) demonstrating that

despite that evidence, the Trial Court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence.
In the case at bar, Appellant has failed to
present any of the evidence upon which the judge based
his very detailed findings. Instead, he has chosen to
make conclusionary statements, many of which are flagrant
misrepresentations

of the actual testimony, and has

9

further chosen to base those conclusionary statements on
only his side of the disputed testimony. For example,
Appellant's Brief states that Mrs. Tizpa charged items
costing $7,000.00 for Mr. Ryan McGavin, but her testimony
and documentary evidence showed items costing less than
$500.00 (TT 164). Appellant's Brief states that Mrs.
Tizpa took funds totalling about $1,200.00 from the
children's savings accounts over a period of time but it
forgets to mention that Mr. Tizpa had withdrawn all
$8,000.00 from the family savings at UP&L, and the
$4,500.00 from Desertview and that he closed all other
joint accounts and left Mrs. Tizpa with none of the
marital savings, long before she took any money from the
children's accounts. (TT 172-175). Appellant's Brief
states that Mrs. Tizpa violated the Court's Temporary
Order by associating with Mr. McGavin in the children's
presence but it fails to demonstrate any intentional
violation on her part and
testimony

to

the

contrary

it ignores Mrs. Tizpa's
(TT

275-276).

Finally

Appellant's Brief repeatedly relies on Dr. Smith's homestudy but fails to "marshall the evidence" which showed
why the Trial Court lacked confidence in the report,
namely, Dr. Smith had become personally involved with Mr.
10

Tizpa, failed to evaluate evidence favorable to Mrs.
Tizpa's position

(TT 291-305) and, according to Mrs.

Tryfonas (TT 81-84) and Misty Matthews (TT 122-125),
misrepresented their interviews in his report.
Appellant's burden requires that he marshall,
not ignore, the evidence which supports the Trial Court's
ruling but, in the case at bar, Appellant has presented
only his side of the disputed testimony.
Since Appellant has not met his burden for
appellate review, Respondent urges this Court to renew
its position as stated in Riche, supra, and decline to
further consider Appellant's attack on the Trial Court's
Findings with respect to custody.

11

II
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS IN
EVALUATING ITS CUSTODY AWARD AND ENTERED SPECIFIC
FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THEY ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended 1988, provides:
(1) If a husband and wife having
minor children are separated, or
their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an
order for the future care and custody
of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody,
the court shall consider the best
interests of the child and the past
conduct
and demonstrated
moral
standards of each of the parties. The
court may inquire of the children and
take
into
consideration
the
children's desires regarding the
future custody, but the expressed
desires are not controlling and the
court may determine the children's
custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court
shall consider, among other factors
the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the
best
interests
of
the
child,
including allowing the child frequent
and continuing contact with the
noncustodial parent as the court
finds appropriate.
Said section requires the Trial Court to apply
the "best interests of the child" test. Although no
specific list of factors defining the best interests test
12

can be applied to all cases, the courts have provided
direction with respect to a number of significant factors
which should be considered by the Trial Court. Smith v.
Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986). In Pusev v. Pusev. 728
P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court identified
four factors: the identity of the primary caretaker, the
parent with greater flexibility to provide personal care
for the child, the parent with whom the child has spent
significant time pending custody determination, and the
stability
factors

of environment
include:

the

of each parent. Additional

parent

who

provides

a

moral

environment more conducive to the child's needs. Shioii
v. Shioii, supra; and Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623
(Utah 1987); the needs of the children and which parent
best meets those needs, Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d
994 (Utah 1986); the emotional stability of the parents,
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), and
Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987); the
wisdom of dividing the children's custody or preserving
the children together as a family unit, Joraenson v.
Joraenson, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) and Pusey v. Pusey,
supra.

13

In the case at bar, a review of the Trial
Court's

Findings

of

Fact

and

Memorandum

Decision

demonstrates the application of these factors by the
court in arriving at its determination of a result which
would be in the best interests of each of the minor
children. The Court did not lump the children together
as though they were some indistinguishable mass, but
rather evaluated

each child's needs individually to

determine what was in the best interest of each child.
That approach was consistent with the testimony of
Plaintiff's witnesses who described the unique abilities,
deficiencies and needs of each child. It would have been
a grave injustice to the children to assume that two
year old Azita's best interests would be identical to
those of

seven year old

Camellia, who has several

learning disabilities, or to those of the intensely proud
and independent twelve year old Omeid. Additionally, it
would have been an equally grave injustice to assume that
the best interests of the three (3) daughters would be
the same as those of the son, given the cultural and
psychological

differences

between

their

mother

and

father, which will be discussed at length later in this
brief.
14

The Trial Court expressly acknowleuged, in
paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact, as follows:
The Court is familiar with the
relevant case law and particularly
the best interests test as defined
in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah
1986). The Court is also mindful of
the numerous other cases which
outline additional factors which the
court must take into consideration
in determining what is in the best
interests of the minor children.
(FF6, RA 145, Addendum B).
After stressing the difficult nature of this
custody determination and the need to protect the best
interests of each of the children (FF6, RA 144, Addendum
B) , the Court then went on to enter express findings
addressing each of the major relevant factors:
A.
That both parents have the
necessary skills to take care of the
daily physical needs of the children
and that neither parent has abused
or significantly
neglected
the
children in the past.
B.
The Court finds that the
Plaintiff has been the primary
caretaker of the children since their
respective births until the time of
the separation of the parties in
approximately February of 1988.
Plaintiff has continued to be the
primary caretaker of the three (3)
minor daughters of the parties since
the time of the separation of the
parties. The Court further finds that
the parties' son, Omeid, has been in
the care and custody of the Defendant
15

for a time period following shortly
after the separation of the parties
in February of 1988.
C.
The Court finds that during the
course of this marriage and up to the
present time, the Defendant has
maintained full time employment with
Utah Power and Light and also runs
and operates a Karate school and
studio on a part time basis and that
he has had little time to devote to
the every day care and supervision
of the children. The Court finds that
the Plaintiff has not worked during
this marriage but has devoted her
full time to the care and supervision
of the children, except that she has
recently started a part time job that
takes her out of the home for
approximately 20 hours a week.
D.
The Court finds that each of
these children has specialized needs
which need to be addressed by the
Court in arriving at the Court's
decision on custody.
E.
The youngest child, Azita, age
2, has never had another caretaker
except her mother and the Court finds
that there is a strong bond of love
and affection between the Plaintiff
and this youngest child. When the
Plaintiff is working her few hours
each week, the Plaintiff's mother has
been providing care for the child and
that
arrangement
is
working
satisfactorily. The Court finds that
it is in Azita's best interest not
to disrupt that strong bond of love
and affection with the Plaintiff.
F.
The Court finds that Camellia,
age
7,
has
several
learning
disabilities and is enrolled in a
16

special
education
course
that
requires extra help and supervision
outside of school and that the
Plaintiff has been supplying that
extra help and supervision. This
child is making excellent progress
in her schooling and training but
will need continued special help for
several hours a day if her progress
is to continue. The Plaintiff has
been supplying this help and is in
a position to continue devoting the
time necessary to assist Camellia in
her future studies.
G.
Omeid, the son of these parties,
nearly age 12, has developed a great
amount of animosity toward his mother
because of her prior activity and
expresses a strong desire to remain
with his father where he has been
since the temporary order was issued
in April
of
1989. Omeid
is
progressing well in his schooling,
shows no signs of personal or social
maladjustment, and seems to be happy
living with his father. Because of
the strong animosity that he has
developed against his mother, it
would not be in his best interest to
force him to live with her at this
time. The Court finds that it is in
Omeid's best interests that he be
allowed to remain with his father.
H.
The parties oldest daughter,
Careshmeh, age 14 plus, has expressed
a strong and determined desire to
live with her mother and is very
emphatic in opposition to living with
her father. The Court finds that she
is
well-adjusted
socially,
is
receiving
high
grades
in her
schooling, is active in various
school and church activities and is
happy living with her mother. The
17

Court finds that it would not be in
Careshmeh's best interests to force
her to live with her father at this
time.
I.
The Court finds that if the
Defendant was given custody of the
two (2) younger children, he would
have to employ a daycare provider for
substantial periods of time and
either spend special time with
Camellia or employ a tutor for her.
The activities required by the tutor
and a daycare provider are presently
being adequately provided for by the
Plaintiff. The Court finds that the
Plaintiff's schedule is the more
flexible one in meeting the needs of
these two (2) younger children and
particularly the special needs of the
minor child, Camellia.
J.
The Court particularly finds
that it would certainly be a
detriment to the two (2) younger
children to remove them from the care
and custody of their mother.
K.
The Court finds that there is
no doubt that the Plaintiff has shown
very
poor
judgment
in
her
relationship with a sixteen (16) year
old boy named Ryan McGavin. Her
indiscretions in this regard cannot
be tolerated and, if they were to
continue, could have a detrimental
affect on the children. These past
activities
have
not
had
a
demonstrable effect on the children,
except for the boy, Omeid. Although
there seems to be some factual
dispute about the matters contained
in the family study performed by Dr.
Smith,
the
doctor's
final
recommendation to the Court is
primarily based on the general
18

unwholesome character of Mr. McGavin,
and
the
Plaintiffs
continued
association with him. There is no
doubt that Plaintiff's association
with
Mr.
McGavin
has
caused
considerable embarrassment to all of
the family in the community in the
past. Dr. Smith also testified that
with respect to the two (2) younger
children of the parties, they were
of such a young age that they had no
appreciable understanding of that
relationship and therefore had not
been detrimentally effected by same.
The Plaintiff testified that she has
had little association with Mr.
McGavin since the temporary order was
entered and that if given custody of
the children, she would have no
association with him in the future.
Therefore, the Court finds that it
is in the best interests of the
children that the present custodial
arrangement be continued and that the
Plaintiff be awarded the custody and
control of the three (3) girls and
that the Defendant be awarded the
custody of the parties' son.
L.
The Court further finds that the
visitation schedule that has been set
up in the temporary order has been
working effectively between the
parties and that it is in the best
interests of the minor children that
said visitation order become the
permanent order of visitation in the
final Decree of Divorce.
M.
In the best interests of the
children, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff should be ordered not to
associate with Ryan McGavin at any
time.

19

The evidence at trial supported each of the
Findings and a sampling of that support is offered as
follows:
Finding 6A. Each side presented evidence of
his or her ability to cook, clean and otherwise provide
for the children's physical needs. Despite Mr. Tizpa7s
allegations that the children had been left alone or
unsupervised (App. Brief p. 20) , the Trial Court expressly
found that neither parent had abused or significantly
neglected the children. Perhaps the Court was persuaded
by the testimony of Social Worker Olivia Sherman, who
admitted that all her referrals against Mrs. Tizpa were
prompted by "persons involved in this suit" (TT 259) and
that

after

department's

her

investigation,

involvement

"without

she

terminated

action"

the

(TT 258) .

Perhaps the Court was persuaded by the stipulated fact
that for fifteen years Mrs. Tizpa was not only a good
mother but was "a wonderful mother and the primary
caretaker of the children." (TT 119). Perhaps the Court
was persuaded that Mr. Tizpa was relying on a few
isolated incident's which occurred during a three (3)
month period from January to April 1989 for which Mrs.
Tizpa had explanations. Whatever the Judge's reasons for
20

believing one witness or discounting another, that was
his prerogative and his decision should be given great
deference. Shioii, supra; Riche, supra.
Finding 6B. The Court's finding that Mrs. Tizpa
had been the primary caretaker of the children was a
stipulated fact. (TT 119). It was also undisputed that
she continued to be the primary caretaker of the parties'
three (3) daughters during the nine (9) months following
the parties7 separation.
Finding 6C. In Finding 6C the Court evaluated
the past

and present

schedules of the parties for

purposes of determining their respective flexibility in
meeting the children's needs. Such an evaluation is in
conformity with Pusey, supra, and the evidence in support
of the finding was undisputed.
Finding 6D. The Court found that the children
had different needs which the Court had to address. A
review of the testimony of Camellia's teacher, Allan
Patterson, concerning her learning disabilities, (TT 103110) or Careshmeh's principal, Tina Crookston describing
her exceptional abilities

(TT 137-147) offers strong

support for the finding as does the obvious range in ages
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of the children from Azita at age two to Careshmeh at age
fifteen (FF 3).
Finding 6E. Concerning two year old Azita, the
Court found a strong bond of love and affection between
Mrs. Tizpa and this child. The Court also found that the
child had never had another primary caretaker and that
it was not in Azita's best interests to disrupt that
strong bond. The finding is amply supported by testimony
from not only Mrs. Tizpa, but Careshmeh (TT 20-21) , Larae
Tryfonas (TT 73-74) and Misty Matthews (TT 126-127), and
many

other

witnesses

to

numerous

to

mention,

who

described the relationship between Mrs. Tizpa and Azita,
and Mr. Tizpa's past unwillingness to be involved in
providing daily care for the child.
Finding
seven, the Court

6F. With respect to Camellia, age
found

that the child has

several

learning disabilities and that Mrs. Tizpa has always
helped and supported her and, as a result, the child is
doing very well in school and in social settings. By
comparison, the Court received considerable testimony
that Mr. Tizpa was a harsh disciplinarian, was impatient
with imperfection, and had great difficulty tolerating
Camellia's disabilities (TT 21-23, 216-217). A review of
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the testimony of Mr. Patterson (TT 103-109), strongly
supports the finding. He described the type of parenting
skills that work with children like Camellia and those
that

are

"disastrous".

(TT

109).

The

disastrous

personality traits included expectations which exceeded
the child's ability (TT 109), lack of patience (TT 108),
and harsh or severe disciplinary techniques (TT 107-108) .
From that testimony, as well as the numerous descriptions
of Mr. Tizpa's personality, and the Judge's ability to
observe Mr. Tizpa's demeanor in the courtroom, it is
reasonable to assume that Mrs. Tizpa was the only
potential custodian for Camellia. In fact in Finding 6J,
the Court expressly found it would be a detriment to the
two younger children to remove them from their mother's
care, and Mr. Patterson's testimony lends a great deal
of support to that position.
Finding 6G and 6H. Next the Court faced the
extremely difficult task of determining custody of the
two older children Careshmeh, age fifteen, and Omeid, age
twelve. A review of each child's testimony in chambers
will indicate just how strongly each one felt about their
respective custodians. Contrary to Appellant's attempts
to label Careshmeh as a lying, immature child (App. Brief
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p. 15) , the majority of the witnesses described both
Careshmeh and Omeid as very bright, talented, articulate,
super-achievers with a list of accomplishments that would
make most adults envious. In analyzing the feelings of
these children, the Judge wisely perceived that it would
be unhealthy, and possibly even dangerous, to try and
force them to live with the alternative parent. Please
note the findings expressly state "forced". (FF6 G and
H) .

The

Judge

then

examined

the

current

living

arrangements of each and found that they were both doing
very well. In spite of Mr. Tizpa's allegations, the
testimony

of Tina

Crookston,

Careshmeh7s

principal,

demonstrated that there had been little, if any, negative
impact on Careshmeh, and that the child continued to
excel both academically and socially (TT 137-147) . After
hearing all the testimony and having the benefit of not
only hearing the children's words, but observing the
strength of their feelings, the Trial Judge found it was
not in their best interests to force them to alter their
chosen environments and those findings should be accorded
great deference. Riche, supra; Shioii, supra.
Finding 6K. The Court received

substantial

testimony concerning Mrs. Tizpa's relationship with Ryan
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McGavin

and

the effect,

or lack thereof, upon the

children. With respect to the two younger children, the
Court found that the relationship had no detrimental
effect as they had no understanding or comprehension of
it. That finding is supported by Dr. Smith's testimony
during cross-examination

(TT 298-299). The testimony

disclosed varying effects on the two older children; it
also disclosed the effects each child was experiencing
as

a

result

relationship.

of

their

father's

reaction

to

the

In the Order on Order to Show Cause

(Addendum C) , the Court found that Omeid's attitude
toward his mother was being "nurtured" by the statements
and actions of his father. (Order, April 24, 1989, page
2, Addendum C) . It is arguable whether Mrs. Tizpa's
relationship affected the older children or whether Mr.
Tizpa's statements and actions about it to the children
created the greater damage. Either way, it polarized them
to a point that neither of them would have benefited from
a change in the custodial relationship (FF6G and H) . Mrs.
Tizpa testified at trial that she had had little contact
with Ryan since the Order to Show Cause Hearing in April,
1989, none of which was in the children's presence, and
that they had gone their separate ways (TT 275-276) . She
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advised the Court that she would willingly agree to an
order that she have no contact with him (TT 326). Under
subpoena by Appellant, Ryan McGavin told the court the
same thing

(TT 462)• Appellant contends that the Trial

Court should have removed the girls because of the
mother's indiscretion. Who would that have punished—the
mother or the girls! The Court weighed the best interests
of these children and the effect of Mrs. Tizpa's conduct
on them and expressly

found

it to be

in the best

interests of the three daughters to remain with Mrs.
Tizpa.
Finally, in the Findings, the Trial Court sidestepped a major issue that permeated the entire trial and
which lends strong support to the Findings of Fact and
the ultimate decision of the Court: Appellant's cultural
background has created a strong gender-bias that is not
consistent with the girls' best interests, particularly
if their mother's mitigating influence is removed from
the home.
Mrs. Tizpa testified to a life of consistent,
continual, complete domination from the time of her
marriage to the date of separation (TT 202-212; OTSC T
70-76). That domination is consistent with Mr. Tizpa's
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Iranian background which gives the husband total control
over his wife and children (OTSC 32-37). Every aspect of
Mrs. Tizpa's life, and the life of the children, was
dictated

by

Mr.

Tizpa

and

enforced

by

fear

and

intimidation. Mrs. Tizpa's testimony was supported by
Careshmeh and Mrs. Connie Kennick who described the
heartrending incident when the child was forced to give
up her dancing because Mr. Tizpa objected to the dance
outfits after age twelve. (TT 209-211, TT 154). When
Careshmeh was elected cheerleader by her classmates, Mr.
Tizpa forbid her to be a cheerleader and told her, in
front of the other children, that cheerleaders were sluts
and prostitutes (TT 27, OTSC 66-67) . At the Order to Show
Cause hearing, psychologist Delvin McFarland, one of
Appellant's

witnesses,

testified

to

the

cultural

differences he perceived which required that Mr. Tizpa
be honored, respected and in charge of all aspects of his
family's life (OTSC 32-37). Mrs. Tizpa testified about
the husband's right to kill a wife in Iran and being
constantly told "that she came into the marriage in her
wedding dress and she would leave it in her wedding
dress", a reference to the fact that Iranian women are
buried in their wedding dresses (TT 336-338). Detective
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Sergeant Milburn testified about Mr. Tizpa's proficiency
as an instructor in marshal arts and admitted that he
could not defend himself if confronted by Mr. Tizpa. Mrs.
Tizpa advised

the Court that the only

"acceptable"

companions she ever had were her mother and the children
and friends of the children (OTSC 70-76), which gives
some insight into her relationship with a 16 years old.
She further testified that she was not allowed to go with
her lady friends to lunch or shopping because some of
those ladies might smoke or take a drink (OTSC 76) . After
all, according to Mr. Tizpa, Mrs. Tizpa's place was with
the family in the home (OTSC p. 176 line 1 and 2); she
was to dress appropriately according to his standards
(OTSC 176) , and "something must have been wrong with her
if she was out at 10:00 p.m. at night" (OTSC 176). The
Court might find Mr. Tizpa's methods of "disciplining"
his wife rather interesting. When she came home one night
at 11:30 p.m., his testimony provides (TT 137):
She was with my daughter, of course.
And she stood and told me very
boldly, "I was out." I got mad at
her. I strike her. I moved her head
with my hand, and I kicked her in the
butt. You understand, I did not —
I did not hit her [so] hard that she
could not function. If I kick hard,
she would not be able to be here now.
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Mr. Tizpa's attitude was further demonstrated when he
instructed Mrs. Tizpa's counsel, a woman, to address him
as Mr. Tizpa, in a tone that could only be appreciated
by those in the courtroom (TT 169) . The record is filled
with support for Mrs. Tizpa's descriptions of her life.
LaRae Tryfonas, Tauna's mother, described the
years of domination and fear (TT 67-86). Peggy Farlaino
(TT 115-118) described the extreme restrictions placed
on her relationship with Mrs. Tizpa because of Mr.
Tizpa's expectations and of the attempted intimidation
by Mr. Tizpa that hung over the trial like a black cloud
(TT 119). In fact, aside from the appraisers, about the
only witnesses who had not noticed the gender-bias were
Mr. Tizpa's family and friends who were also raised in
Iran.
Since the Findings of Fact are amply supported
by the record and since the inherent cultural gender-bias
displayed by Mr. Tizpa was not in the best interests of
the minor daughters, the Trial Court's decision is not
clearly erroneous and should therefore be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, Appellant has failed to meet his
burden on appeal because: (1) he has not marshalled all
the evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings,
and

(2) he has not demonstrated

that despite that

evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so lacking in
support

as to be against the clear weight

of the

evidence• Because of that failure, Respondent urges this
Court to review its position as stated in Riche, supra,
and decline to further consider Appellant's attack on the
Trial Court's Findings on custody.
Additionally, since the Findings of Fact are
amply supported by the record and since the inherent
cultural gender-bias displayed by Mr. Tizpa was not in
the best interests of the parties' minor daughters, the
Trial Court's decision is not clearly erroneous and
should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July,
1990.
JOKNE PAPPAS WHITE
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Respondent
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ADDENDUM "A"
Memorandum Decision
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TAUNA LEE TIZPA,

i

MEMORANDUM DECISION

i

C i v i l No. 15776

Plaintiff,
vs.
AKBAR TIZPA,

Defendant.

]

This matter came on regularly for trial before the
Court on the 14th day of September, 1989, and the Court heard
testimony and received exhibits for and on behalf of each of
the parties, and took this matter under advisement and rules
as hereinafter stated.
The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have
developed between these parties and the Court therefore grants
a divorce in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
and in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
The Court must first determine the question of
custody of the children since the balance of the distribution
of property, and other matters, depend a good bit on what
disposition is made in that regard.
Because of the conflict in the evidence and testimony
as presented by each side, the Court finds it extremely

this particular case.

The Court must, of necessity, make its

decision based upon a determination of what is in the best
interest of those children.

The Court finds that both parents

have the necessary skills to take care of the daily needs of
the children, and that neither has abused or significantly
neglected the children in the past.
The Court finds that the plaintiff has been the
primary caretaker of the children since their birth, and up to
the time of the separation of the parties in approximately
February of 1988, she has continued to be the primary caretaker
except for their son, Omeid, who has been in the custody of the
defendant.
During the course of this marriage and up to the
present time, the defendant has maintained full employment and
runs and operates a karate school and studio on a part time
basis, and has had little time to devote to the everyday care
and supervision of the children.

The plaintiff has not worked

and has devoted her fulltime to the care and supervision of the
children except that she now has a small part time job that
takes her out of the home for approximately 20 hours a week.
The youngest child, age two, has never had another
caretaker except her mother and there is a strong bond of
affection between the plaintiff and this youngest child.

When

the plaintiff is working her few hours each week, the grandmother of the child, the plaintiff's mother, has been the

primary caretaker for the child during this period of time.
Camellia, age seven, has a learning disablity and is
enrolled in a special education course that requires extra help
and supervision outside of school that the plaintiff has been
supplying.

This child is making excellent progress in her

schooling and training and will need continued special help for
several hours each day if her progress is to continue. The
plaintiff has been supplying this help and is in a position to
continue devoting the time necessary to assist the girl in her
future studies.
The son of the parties, age nearly twelve, has
developed a great amount of animosity toward his mother because
of her prior activities and expresses a strong desire to remain
with his father where he has been since the temporary order was
issued in April of 1989.

The boy is progressing well in his

school, shows no signs of personal or social maladjustment, and
seems to be happy living with his father.

Because of the

strong animosity that he has developed against his mother, it
would not be in his best interest to force him to live with her
at this time.
The oldest daughter, Careshmeh, age fourteen plus,
" a s expressed a strong and determined desire to live with her
mother and is very emphatic in opposition to living with her
father,

she is well adjusted socially, is receiving high

9rades in her schooling, is active in various school and church
a

ctivities and is happy living with her mother.
3

The defendant, if given custody of the two younger
childrenf would have to employ a day care provider and either
spend special time with Camellia or employ a tutor for her.
The activities required by the tutor are presently being
adequately provided by her mother.
The Court feels that it would certainly be a
detriment to the two younger children to remove them from the
custody and care of their mother.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff has shown very
poor judgment in her relationship with a 16 year old boy by the
i

name of Ryan McGavin.

Her indiscretions in this regard cannot

be tolerated, and if they are to continue it could have a
detrimental effect on the children.

These past activities have

not had a demonstrable effect on the children except for the
boy# Omeid, which the Court has already mentioned.

Although

there seems to be some factual dispute about the matters
contained in the family study performed by Dr. Smith and
reported to the Court, the Doctor's final recommendation to the
Court is primarily based upon the general unwholesome character
of Mr. McGavin, and the plaintiff1s continued association with
him.

There is no doubt that her association with McGavin has

caused considerable embarrassment to all of the family in the
community in the past.
However# the plaintiff testified that she has had
little association with Mr. McGavin since the Temporary Order
4

was entered, and that, if given custody of the children, she
would have no association with him in the future.
Therefore, the Court finds that it is in the best
interest of the children that the present custodial arrangement
continue.

That the plaintiff be awarded custody and control of

the three girls, and that the defendant be awarded the custody
of their son.

The Court orders that the Decree provide for

custody accordingly.
The Court further orders that the visitation order
as contained and set up in the Temporary Order become the
permanent order of visitation in the final Decree.
The Court further orders that the plaintiff not
associate with Ryan McGavin at any time.
The Court finds that the defendant has a gross
income from his employment of approximately $4,170.00 per
month, and that the plaintiff has a gross income from her
employment of approximately $344.00 per month.
Although the parties have some income from their
rental property, the Financial Statement as submitted by the
defendant shows that there is a negative cash-flow on this
Property after payment of the mortgage payments and that they
have had to supplement this income in order to make the
Payments on the property.

The record further shows that the

defendant received for the first eight months of 1989 a net
^•ncome from his karate business in the approximate sum of
5

$3/000.00 when we subtract the depreciation that he contained
in his schedule.

This schedule also shows that there may be

some duplication of personal expenses that he has charged
against this business account.
The net amount received from the karate studio has
been and will be required to make up the negative cash-flow on
the rental property, and so the Court cannot take this amount
into account in fixing child support and alimony.
Based upon the Child Support Guideline Worksheets
and the Financial Statements of the parties, the Court finds
that the defendant can reasonably pay, and that the plaintiff
will need the sum of $266.00 per month for each of the children
in her custody.

The Court will not order that the plaintiff

pay to the defendant any sum to contribute to the support of
their son because of her extremely limited income.
The income statement of the defendant shows that he
has a monthly deduction of $333.00 per month to a savings
account, and pays life insurance premiums in the amount of
$116.00 per month.

Although the Court feels that these

deductions are admirable, they should not continue if those
funds are needed for family necessities.

The defendant's

Financial Statement farther shows that he pays $325.00 per
month for rent, and the evidence shows that he is living in one
°f their own apartments.
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The plaintiff's Financial Statement lists net income
of $289.00 a month, and expenses of $2,117.00.

Her biggest

expense is for debt payments of $548.00 a month on charge
accounts that carry a high interest rate. The plaintiff
should, and can, make arrangements for reduction of this
expense by application of other assets or by making other
arrangements for the payment of those debts.
Based upon the relative incomes, the length of
marriage, the ability to pay, and the needs of the parties, the
Court has concluded that the defendant can pay, and the
plaintiff will reasonably need the sum of $600.00 per month by
way of alimony.
The payment of support and alimony shall commence
with the month of October, 1989, and shall be payable one half
on or before October 15, 1989, and one half on or before the
last day of the last day of October, 1989, and continuing
monthly thereafter.

The Court further orders that the

Temporary Order in affect shall continue through the month of
September, 1989.
The Court orders that the home of the parties,
together with the adjacent lot, L>e placed in the names of the
parties as tenants in common, and that the plaintiff shall have
the right to the use of the property for herself and the three
children until such time as she vacates the property,
remarries, or the youngest child reaches 18 years of age, at
7

which time the property will be sold and the net equity
received from the sale shall be divided equally between the
parties.
Until that property is sold, the plaintiff shall pay
the taxes and insurance on the property, and shall be
responsible to take care of necessary repairs and maintenance
to keep the property in a reasonable state suitable for
habitation.
The Court further orders that all other real
property be held in the name of the parties as tenants in
common, and that it be listed for sale, and that upon sale the
net proceeds thereof be divided between the parties.

Until the

property is sold, the defendant shall be entitled to all income
from the property and shall be obligated to pay all mortage
payments, taxes and insurance, and upkeep on the property.

In

the event the defendant wishes to keep the karate studio, he
may do so by paying to the plaintiff one half of the current
appraised value as determined by two appraisers, one to be
chosen by each of the parties.
There is a conflict of testimony regarding an
alledged debt owed to defendant's father.

Since t'rere is no

w

ritten evidence of the debt, no schedule of payments/ no due

date established, and no recorded security instruments, the
Court orders that each party will be responsible to pay one
ha
e

lf of any debt owed to the plaintiff's father if that debt is

stablished as a legal obligation.

The Court orders that the plaintiff receive one half
of the defendant's unincumbered stock in his Utah Power and
Light Employee's Savings and Stock Purchase Plan of Pacificorp
and she shall be responsible to pay any tax on her share of
that stock when it is withdrawn and delivered to her*
The defendant shall be entitled to the balance of
the stock and savings plans and he will be ordered to assume
and pay the loan on the encumbered portion of that stock that
he is to receive.
The Court further orders that all of the children's
savings accounts go to the party who has custody of that child
for the use and benefit of the child.
The Court further orders that the IRA account in the
Deseret View Credit Union be awarded to the plaintiff, and that
the IRA account in All State be awarded to the defendant.
The Court further orders that the policies of
insurance on each of the children are to be awarded to the
party who has that child in his or her custody and if the party
wishes to continue the policy, the custodial parent will be
responsible to pay for any premiums on the policy.
The Court awards to the plaintiff the 1986 Jeep, the
1980 Buick, and the 1978 Dodge van.

The defendant is awarded

the 1979 Mercedes, the 1979 Ford truck, 1981 Yamaha, and the
1983 3-Wheeler.
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The Court awards to the plaintiff the furniture,
fixtures and contents of the home of the parties, except the
following items are awarded to the defendant:
All of his personal items, and all of the furniture
and fixtures in the home that were exclusively used by Omeid,
together with all of Omeid1s personal effects including the
Nintendo,

All of his office furniture equipment, his tools,

the stereo, the Epson computer, the non-remote TV, the camera
and projector, the family room set with the fold out queen size
bed and loveseat.
The defendant is further awarded all of his personal
effects and one-third of all the bedding, linens, towels,
cooking utensils, and cooking hardware, so as to allow him to
set up housekeeping for himself and his son.
The Court awards to the defendant the shotgun, the
357 Mangum, and two .22 Rifles, and awards to the plaintiff the
30 06 Rifle and the .22 pistol.
The Court awards to the defendant the red and blue
13 x 9 carpet and on red and blue 21 x 31 carpet.

The Court

awards to the plaintiff two red carpets, each 3' x 61, one red
and blue carpet, 31 x 61, and one red carpet 2% x 5'.
The Court awards all of the jewelry to the plaintiff
that she now "has in her possession except for the gold lion
rin

9 that is awarded to the defendant.
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The Court awards to the defendant the jewelry that
^e now has in his possession except the wedding ring and band,
and the engagement ring and the one-third carat diamond ring.
The Court further orders that the plaintiff will pay
and assume the debts listed on her financial statement, and the
defendant will assume and pay all other debts not specifically
provided for in this decision.
The Court further orders that in the event the
defendant is entitled to retirement benefits not covered by his
stock purchase plan, that the plaintiff shall be entitled to
one-half of said benefits that were accumulated during the
period of this marriage, and the Court further directs that the
parties enter into a qualified domestic relations division of
that retirement if it exists.
The Court further orders that the defendant assist
the plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and benefits
if the plaintiff desires those benefits and provided that she
pay the necessary payment that would be required to obtain them.
The Court further orders that the plaintiff sign
such documents as may be necessary to allow the defendant to
claim the three children in her custody as dependents on his
income tax, and that he be allowed to continue this claimed
deduction until such time as the plaintiff may obtain fulltime
employment.

In the event she does obtain fulltime employment,

the Court directs that the plaintiff shall be allowed to claim
11

the two youngest children as dependents on her income tax
return and the defendant shall be allowed to claim the two
oldest children as dependents on his income tax.

In the event

that the plaintiff is not willing to sign the necessary
documents as indicated herein, the Court will, upon petition of
the defendant, reconsider the amount of alimony that the Court
has ordered him to pay under this decision.
The Court further orders that the parties divide any
funds that may be available to them under the defendant's
insurance plan to pay for attorney's fees, and that each of the
parties assume and pay all of the balance of their attorney
fees and costs.
The Court directs that the attorney for the
plaintiff prepare the necessary Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree in accordance with this Memorandum Decision.
DATED this

. ^ y j ^ d a y of September, 1989.
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TAUNA LEE TIZPA,
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND
])
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
;

Plaintiff,
Vs.

I Civil No. 15776

AKBAR TIZPA,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
trial before the Court on the 14th and 15th days of September,
1989, the Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge, presiding;
and the Plaintiff having appeared personally and with her
counsel, JOANE PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant

having

appeared personally and with his counsel, SHARON DONOVAN; and,
the Court having heard sworn testimony and having received
exhibits for and on behalf of each of the parties and having
taken this matter under advisement now finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the parties hereto are actual and bona

fide residents of Carbon County, State of Utah, arid have been
for more than three months immediately next prior to the
commencement of this action.

2.

That the Plaintiff and the Defendant were

married on the 29th day of June,. 1974 at Price, Carbon County,
State of Utah and have been husband and wife since that time*
3.

That there have been four (4) children born as

the issue of this marriage, namely, CAHESHMEH, a girl, born
2-24-75; OMEID, a boy, born 12-12-77; CAMELLIA, a girl, born
2-19-82; and AZITA, a girl, born 6-19-87.
4.

The Court finds that irreconcilable differences

have developed between these parties and, therefore, finds
that the Court should grant a divorce

in favor of the

Plaintiff and against the Defendant and in favor of the
Defendant and against the Plaintiff.
5.

The Court finds that it must first determine

the issue of custody of the children since the best interests
of

the

children

will

also,

of

necessity,

affect

the

distribution of property and other matters at issue in this
case.
6.

The Court finds that there has been substantial

conflict in the evidence and the testimony as presented by
each party in this matter. The Court finds it extremely
difficult to make a detenaination of custody of the children
in this particular case. The Court must, of necessity, make
its decision based upon its determination of what is in the
best interests of those children. The Court is familiar with
the relevant case law and particularly the best interest tests
as defined in Pusev v. Pusev. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). The
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Court is also mindful of the numerous other cases which
outline additional factors which the Court must take into
consideration in determining what is in the best interests of
the minor children. Bearing those standards in mind, the Court
finds as follows:
A.

That

both parents have

the

necessary

skills to take care of the daily physical needs of the
children and that neither parent has abused or significantly
neglected the children in the past.
B.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has

been the primary caretaker

of the children

since their

respective births until the time of the separation of the
parties in approximately February of 1988. Plaintiff has
continued to be the primary caretaker of the three (3) minor
daughters of the parties since the time of the separation of
the parties. The Court further finds that the parties' son,
0MEID, has been in the care and custody of the Defendant for
a time period following shortly after the separation of the
parties in February of 1988.
C.

The Court finds that during the course of

this marriage and up to the present time, the Defendant has
maintained full time employment with Utah Power and Light and
also runs and operates a Karate school and studio on a part
time basis and that he has had little time to devote to the
every day care and supervision of the children. The Court
finds that the Plaintiff has not worked during this marriage
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but has devoted her full time to the care and supervision of
the children, except that she has recently started a part time
job that takes her out of the home for approximately 20 hours
a week.
D.

The Court finds that each these children

have specialized needs which need to be addressed by the Court
in arriving at the Court's decision on custody.
E.

The youngest child, AZITA, age 2, has

never had another care taker except her mother and the Court
finds that there is a strong bond of love and affection
between the Plaintiff and this youngest child. When the
Plaintiff is working her few hours each week, the Plaintiff's
mother has been providing care for the child and that that
arrangement is working satisfactorily. The Court finds that
it is in AZITA'S best interest not to disrupt that strong bond
of love and affection with the Plaintiff.
F.

The Court finds that CAMELLIA, age 7, has

several learning disabilities and is enrolled in a special
education course that requires extra help and supervision
outside of school and that the Plaintiff has been supplying
that

extra

help

and

supervision. This

child

is making

excellent progress in her schooling and training but will need
continued special help for several hours a day if her progress
is to continue. The Plaintiff has been supplying this help and
is in a position to continue devoting the time necessary to
assist CAMELLIA in her future studies.
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G.

OMEID, the son of these parties, nearly

age 12, has developed a great amount of animosity toward his
mother because of her prior activity and expresses a strong
desire to remain with his father where he has been since the
temporary

order was

issued

in April

of

1989. OMEID is

progressing well in his schooling, shows no signs of personal
or social maladjustment, and seems to be happy living with his
father. Because of the strong animosity that he has developed
against his mother, it would not be in his best interest to
force him to live with her at this time. The Court finds that
it is in OMEID'S best interests that he be allowed to remain
with his father.
H.

The parties oldest daughter, CARESHMEH,

age 14 plus, has expressed a strong and determined desire to
live with her mother and is very emphatic in opposition to
living with her father. The Court finds that she is well
adjusted socially, is receiving high grades in her schooling,
is active in various school and church activities and is happy
living with her mother. The Court finds that it would not be
in CARESHMEH'S best interests to force her to live with her
father at this time.
I.

The Court finds that if the Defendant was

given custody of the two (2) younger children, he would have
to employ a daycare provider for substantial periods of time
and either spend special time with CAMELUCA or employ a tutor
for her. The activities required by the tutor and a daycare
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provider are presently being adequately provided for by the
Plaintiff. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's schedule is
the more flexible one in meeting the needs of these two (2)
younger children and particularly the special needs of the
minor child, CAMELLIA.
J.

The Court particularly finds that it would

certainly be a detriment to the two (2) younger children to
remove them from the care and custody of their mother.
K.

The Court finds that there is no doubt

that the Plaintiff has shown very poor judgment
relationship with a sixteen

in her

(16) year old boy named RYAN

HCGAVIN. Her indiscretions in this regard cannot be tolerated
and, if they were to continue, could have a detrimental affect
on the children. These

past

activities have

not had a

demonstrable effect on the children, except for the boy,
OMEID. Although there seems to be some factual dispute about
the matters contained in the family study performed by Dr.
Smith, the doctor's final recommendation to the Court is
primarily based on the general unwholesome character of Mr.
McGavin, and the Plaintiff's continued association with him.
There is no doubt that Plaintiff's association with Mr.
McGavin has caused considerable embarrassment to all of the
family in the community in the past. Dr. Smith also testified
that with respect to the two

(2) younger children of the

parties, they were of such a young age that they had no
appreciable understanding of that relationship and therefore
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had not been detrimentally effected by same. The Plaintiff
testified that she has had little association with Mr. McGavin
since the temporary order was entered and that if given
custody of the children, she would have no association with
him in the future. Therefore, the Court finds that it is in
the best interests of the children that the present custodial
arrangement be continued and that the Plaintiff be awarded the
custody and control of the three (3) girls and that the
Defendant be awarded the custody of the parties' son.
L.

The

Court

further

finds

that

the

visitation schedule that has been set up in the temporary
order has been working effectively between the parties and
that it is in the best interests of the minor children that
said visitation order become the permanent order of visitation
in the final Decree of Divorce.
M.

In the best interests of the children, the

Court finds that the Plaintiff should be ordered not to
associate with RYAN MCGAVIN at any time.
7.
income

The Court finds that the Defendant has a gross

from his

employment

at Utah

Power

and

Light of

approximately FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY ($4#170.00)
DOLLARS per month and that the Plaintiff has a gross income
from her part time employment of approximately THREE HUNDRED
FORTY-FOUR ($344.00) DOLLARS per month.
8.

Although the parties have some income from

their rental property, the financial statement as submitted
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by the Defendant shows that there is a negative cash flow on
this property after payment of the mortgage payments and that
they have had to supplement this income in order to make the
payments on the property. The record further shows that the
Defendant received, for the first eight (8) months of 1989,
a net income from his karate business in the approximate sum
of THREE THOUSAND ($3#000.00) DOLLARS when we subtract the
depreciation that he contained in his schedule. This schedule
also shows that there may be some duplication of personal
expenses that he has charged against his business account. The
net income received from the karate studio has been and will
be required to make up the negative cash flow on the rental
property so the Court cannot take this amount into account in
fixing child support and alimony.
9.

Based

upon

the

Child

Support

Guideline

Worksheets and the Financial Statements of the parties, the
Court finds that the Defendant can reasonably pay and the
Plaintiff will reasonably need the sum of TWO HUNDRED SIXTYSIX ($266.00) DOLLARS per month for each of the three (3)
children in her custody. The Court will not order that the
Plaintiff pay to the Defendant any sum to contribute to the
support of their son because of her extremely limited income
which the Court has taken into consideration in fixing the
child support awarded herein.
10.

The income statement of the Defendant shows

that he has a monthly deduction of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE
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($333.00)

DOLLARS

per

monch

to

a

savings

account

and

additionally pays life insurance premiums in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED SIXTEEN

($116.00) DOLLARS per month. Although the

Court feels that these deductions are admirable, they should
not continue if those funds are needed for family necessities.
The Defendant's financial statement further shows that he pays
THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE

($325.00) DOLLARS per month for

rent, but the evidence shows that he is living in one of the
parties' own apartments.
11.

The Plaintiff's financial statement lists net

income of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE ($289.00) DOLLARS per month
and expenses of TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN ($2117.00)
DOLLARS per month. Her biggest expense is for debt payments
of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT ($548.00) DOLLARS per month on
charge accounts that carry a high interest rate. The Plaintiff
should, and can, make arrangements for reduction of this
expense by application of other assets or by making other
arrangements for the payment for those debts.
12.

Based on the relative incomes of the parties,

the length of the marriage, the ability to pay, and the needs
of the parties, the Court finds that the Defendant can pay and
the Plaintiff will reasonably need the sum of SIX HUNDRED
($600.00) DOLLARS per month by way of alimony, said alimony
to

terminate

upon

the

Defendant's

death

or

upon

the

Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with an adult male who
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is not a relative. That such alimony award is permanent until
such time as a material change of circumstances occurs.
13.

The

payment

of

support

and

alimony

shall

commence with the month of October, 1989, and shall be payable
at the rate of one-half of said support and alimony on or
before the 15th of October, 1989 and one-half of said support
and alimony on or before the last day of October, 1989 and
that said support and alimony should continue on the same
schedule for each and every month thereafter. The Court
further finds that the Temporary Order which is currently in
effect shall remain in effect through the month of September,
1989.
14.

The Court finds that the home of the parties,

together with the adjacent lot, should be placed in the names
of the parties as tenants in common and that the Plaintiff
should have the right to the exclusive use of the property for
herself and the three (3) children in her custody until such
time as she vacates the property, remarries, or until the
youngest child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, at
which time the Court finds that the property should be sold
and the net equity received from the sale divided equally
between the parties hereto. Until the home property is sold,
the Court finds that the Plaintiff should be required to pay
the taxes and insurance on the property and be responsible to
take care of necessary repairs and maintenance and keep the
property in a reasonable state suitable for habitation.
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15.

The Court further finds that all of the other

real estate property should be placed in the names of the
parties hereto as tenants in common and that said property
should be listed for sale and that upon the sale of each of
the properties the net proceeds therefrom should be divided
equally between the parties. Until the property is sold, the
Defendant should be entitled to all of the income from the
properties and should be obligated to pay all of the mortgage
payments, taxes and insurance and upkeep on said properties
and that he should have the exclusive use of same and the
right to manage same until a sale is obtained for each of said
properties. In the event the Defendant wishes to keep the
karate studio, the Court finds that he should be allowed to
do so provided that he pays to the Plaintiff a sum equal to
one-half of the current appraised value, said appraised value
to be determined by two (2) appraisers, one of which is to be
selected by each of the parties hereto.
16.

The Court finds that there is a conflict in the

testimony regarding the alleged debt owed to the Defendant's
father. Since there is no written evidence of the debt, no
schedule of payments, no due date for the payment of said debt
and no recorded security interests, the Court finds that it
is best to order that each of the parties be responsible to
pay one-half of any debt which may be owed to Plaintiff's
father when and if that debt is ever established as an actual
legal obligation.
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17.

The

Court

finds

that

the

Defendant

has

accumulated Utah Power and Light Stock and/or Pacific Corp.
Stock during the time these parties have been married. The
Court

further

finds

that

approximately

TEN

THOUSAND

($10,000.00) DOLLARS of said stock is encumbered by a loan
against same which was used in acquiring one of the parties7
parcel of real estate. The Court finds that it is equitable
that

the

Plaintiff

receive

one-half

of

the

Defendant's

unencumbered Utah Power and Light and Pacific Corp. Stock and
that she be responsible to pay any tax on her share of that
stock when it is withdrawn and delivered to her. The Court
finds that the Defendant should be awarded his one-half of the
unencumbered Utah Power and Light and Pacific Corp. Stock and
all of the encumbered portion of that stock and that the
Defendant should be required to assume the loan against the
encumbered

portion of that stock and that he should be

required to pay same and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
The Defendant shall be responsible for any taxes on his share
of the unencumbered stock when it is withdrawn. The Court
received substantially conflicting testimony concerning two
(2) FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLARS time certificates
of deposit which are currently in the names of Defendant's
mother

and

sufficient

father. The
evidence

Court

presented

finds that
to

show

there was not

that

those

time

certificates of deposit, as they presently exist, are a
marital asset or that the parties have any interest in them.
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18.

The

Court

further

finds

that

all

of the

children's savings accounts should go to the party who has
custody of that child for the use and benefit of the child.
19.

The Court finds that the IRA account in the

Desertview Credit Union in the sum of approximately FOUR
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE ($4,461.00) DOLLARS should be
awarded to the Plaintiff and that the IRA account at Allstate
in the sum of approximately FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTYTHREE ($5,143.00) DOLLARS should be awarded to the Defendant.
The Court finds that the parties have an Allstate Insurance
policy with a cash value of approximately THREE THOUSAND
($3,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court finds that said policy should
be exchanged for its cash value and that the proceeds be
divided equally between the parties hereto forthwith. In the
event there are any tax consequences which are incurred as a
result of cashing in the IRA accounts, each party should be
required to pay one-half of said tax consequences.
20.

The Court finds that there are policies of

insurance on each of the children and that those policies of
insurance should be awarded to the parent who has that child
in his or her custody. The Court finds that if the party with
custody of that child wishes to continue the policy, then said
custodial parent should be responsible to pay for any premiums
on that policy.
21.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff will need

the use of the 1986 Jeep# 1980 Buick and the 1978 Dodge Van
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and that the Defendant will need the use of the 1979 Mercedes,
the 1979 Ford truck, the 1981 Yamaha and the 1983 threewheeler.
22.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff will need

the furniture, fixtures and appliances located in the home of
the parties, with the exception of the following items which
the Court finds the Defendant will need:
A.
of

the

furniture

All of Defendant's personal items and all
and

fixtures

in

the

home

that

were

exclusively used by Omeid, together with all of Omeid's
personal effects including the Nintendo.
B.

The Defendant will require the use of his

office furniture equipment, his tools, his stereo, the Epson
computer, the non-remote control television set, the camera
and projector, and the family room set with the fold out queen
size bed and loveseat.
C.

The

Defendant

will

need

all

of

his

personal effects and one-third of all of the bedding, linens,
towels, cooking utensils and cooking hardware so as to allow
him to set up housekeeping for himself and OMEID.
D.

The Court finds that the Defendant will

need the shotgun, the 357 Magnum, the two .22 rifles, the
Court finds that the Plaintiff will need and should be awarded
the 30 06 rifle and the .22 pistol.
23.

The Court awards to the Defendant the red and

blue 13 x 9 foot persian carpet and one red and blue 2' x 3'
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persian carpet. The court finds that the Plaintiff should be
given the two red persian carpets, each approximately 3' x 6',
one red and blue persian carpet approximately 3' x 6' and one
persian carpet that is approximately 2' x 5'.
24.

The Court awards all of the jewelry to the

Plaintiff that she now has in her possession which consists
of the diamond ring consisting of two three-quarter carat
diamonds with small diamonds that were a gift to her as a
Mother's Day present, which has a value of $4,000.00, the one
and

one-half

carat

ruby

ring,

which

has

a

value

of

approximately $1,000.00, and the wedding band with diamonds,
which has a value of approximately $800.00, and two gold
chains that are worth approximately $250.00, and three charms
worth approximately $75.00.
She is also awarded her wedding ring, which is
a three-quarter carat diamond with several small diamonds,
having a value of $4,500.00, and her engagement ring which is
one-half

carat

diamond

with

several

small

diamonds

surrounding, which has a value of $1,500.00. These rings were
gifts to her and are treated as her sole property.
The Defendant is awarded the jewelry that he
has in his possession except for the items above that are
awarded to the Plaintiff, and the gold lion ring that is in
the possession of the Plaintiff, which has an approximate
value of $800.00. Some of the items that he has in his
possession consist of: diamond earrings, which have a value
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of approximately $2,500.00, gold coin on a thick chain, which
has a value of approximately $3,000.00, a gold ID bracelet,
which has a value of approximately

$2,000.00, a diamond

necklace, which has a value of approximately $2,800.00, a gold
ring with a large red stone having a value of approximately
$1,500.00, a diamond ring .50 carats, which has a value of
$1,200.00,

nine

gold

charms,

which

have

a

value

of

approximately $2,200.00, a two carat oval diamond ring having
a

value

of

approximately

$4,500.00,

two

necklaces with

religious inscription having a value of approximately $800.00,
and all other miscellaneous gold coins and charms that he now
has in his possession.
The Court will order that the parties exchange the
jewelry items within fifteen (15) days of the date of the
signing of the Decree.
25.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be

required to assume and pay the debts listed on her financial
statement, to-wit:
Visa

$2200.00

Mastercard

$1700.00

ZCMI

$ 243.28

Nordstrom

$ 880.00

Weinstock

$ 750.00

Sears

$1000.00

Discover

$1400.00

Visa

$1300.00
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J C Penney

$ 250.00

Mervins

$ 350.00

The Defendant should be ordered to assume and pay
all other family debts not specifically provided for herein.
26.

The Court further finds that it is equitable

that each of the parties be awarded one-half of any of
Defendant's retirement benefits which exist separate and apart
from the stock which has been acquired by the parties. The
Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of said
retirement benefits which were accumulated during the period
of this marriage and finds and directs that an appropriate
Qualified

Domestic

Relations

Order

be

entered

dividing

Defendant's retirement benefit, if same exists.
27.

The Court further orders that the Defendant

assist the Plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and
benefits if the Plaintiff desires those benefits, provided
that Plaintiff pay the necessary premium payment that would
be required in order to obtain same.
28.

The

Court

finds

that

the

Plaintiff

has

indicated to the Court that she will voluntarily execute tax
documents allocating the children's tax dependency as the
Court deems just and equitable. Based upon that voluntary
agreement by the Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Plaintiff
should be required to sign such documents as may be necessary
to allow the Defendant to claim the three (3) children in
Plaintiff's custody as Defendant's tax exemptions on his
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income tax returns and that he should be allowed to continue
this claim deduction until such time as the Plaintiff may
obtain full time employment. In the event that Plaintiff
obtains full time employment, the Court directs that the
Plaintiff should be allowed to claim the two (2) youngest
children as her dependents on her income tax returns and that
the Defendant should be allowed to claim the two (2) oldest
children as his dependents on his income tax returns. In the
event that the Plaintiff is not willing to sign the necessary
documents, as indicated herein, the Court will, upon petition
by the Defendant, reconsider the amount of alimony that the
Court has ordered him to pay under this decision.
29.

The Court finds that each party should be

ordered to maintain all available medical, dental and/or
optical insurance for the minor children if such insurance is
available to the party as a benefit of their employment. Each
party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonable and
necessary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred on
behalf of the minor children which are not covered by a policy
of insurance.
30.
prepaid

legal

employment

The Court finds that the Defendant has some
insurance

that will

pay

benefits
benefits

available
of

through

his

approximately

ONE

THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS per party. The Court finds that
it is equitable that the parties equally divide any funds that
may be available to them under Defendant's legal insurance
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plan to assist the parties for payment of their Court costs
and attorneys' fees in this matter. After equal application
of the insurance proceeds, each of the parties should be
required to assume and pay the balance of their own Court
costs and attorneys' fees.
31.

The Plaintiff should be entitled to an Order

to Withhold and Deliver pursuant to State law to be held in
the file in the event that the Defendant should become more
than thirty (30) days past due in his child support.
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of
Fact now concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Jurisdiction is proper before this Court.

2.

That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from

the Defendant and the Defendant is granted a divorce from the
Plaintiff.
3.
the minor

That the Plaintiff is awarded the custody of

daughters

of

the

parties,

namely,

CARESHMEH,

CAMELLIA and AZITA. That the Defendant is awarded the custody
of the parties minor son, OMEID. That each party shall have
the right to reasonable visitation with the children in the
other parties' custody, including but not limited to, the
following visitation rights:
A.

That ^ the non-custodial parent shall be

allowed to visit with the children in the custody of the other
parent at all reasonable times and that the Defendant be
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allowed to take the children every other weekend from 10:00
a.m. on Saturday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The Plaintiff
shall be allowed to take OHEID every other weekend from
Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
B.

The Court further orders that the children

shall be allowed to go to their karate lessons with the
Defendant jlf the particular child wishes to do so.
4.

That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the

Plaintiff the sura of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX ($266.00) DOLLARS
per month for each of the three (3) children in Plaintiff's
custody, commencing with the month of October, 1989 • Said
child support shall be payable at the rate of one-half of said
support on or before the 15th of the month and one-half of
said support on or before the last day of the month and said
support shall continue on the same schedule each and every
month thereafter.
5.

That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the

Plaintiff the sum of SIX HUNDRED ($600.00) DOLLARS per month
for and as alimony, commencing with the month of October,
1989. Said alimony shall be payable at the rate of one-half
of said sum on or before the 15th of the month and one-half
of said sum on or before the last day of the month, said
alimony to terminate upon the Defendant's death or upon the
Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with an adult male who
is not a relative. That such alimony award is permanent until
such time as a material change of circumstances occurs.
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6.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

real and personal property during this marriage and said
property is awarded as follows:
A.

The home of the parties, together with the

adjacent lot, is to be placed in the names of the parties as
tenants-in-common. The Plaintiff shall have the right to the
exclusive use of said property for herself and the three (3)
minor children in her custody until such time as she vacates
the property, remarries, or until the youngest child in her
care and custody reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, at
which time the Court orders that the property be sold and the
net equity received from the sale divided equally between the
parties hereto. Until the home property is sold, the Court
orders that the Plaintiff be required to pay the taxes and
insurance on said property and be responsible to take care of
the necessary repairs and maintenance and keep the property
in a reasonable state suitable for habitation.
B.

All of the other real estates properties

owned by these parties shall be placed in the names of the
parties

hereto

as

tenants-in-common

and

each

of

said

properties shall be immediately listed for sale and upon the
sale of each of said properties, the net proceeds therefrom
shall be divided equally between the parties. Until said
properties are sold, the Defendant shall be entitled to all
of the income from the properties and shall be obligated to
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pay all of the mortgage payments, taxes, insurance and upkeep
on said properties and he shall have the exclusive use of same
and the right to manage same until a sale is obtained for each
of said properties. In the event that the Defendant wishes to
keep the karate studio, the Court orders that he should be
allowed to do so provided that he immediately pays to the
Plaintiff a sum equal to one-half of the current appraised
value, said appraised value to be determined by two (2)
appraisers, one (1) on which is to be selected by each of the
parties hereto.
C.

Each party is ordered to be responsible

to pay one-half of any debt which may be owed to Plaintiff's
father when and if that debt is ever established as an actual
legal obligation.
D.

With respect to Defendant's Utah Power and

Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts, said accounts are awarded
as follows:
1.

The Defendant is awarded that portion

of the stock which is encumbered by a loan in the sum of
approximately TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS, provided that
the Defendant assume and pays the outstanding encumbrance
thereon and holds the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
2.

The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of

all unencumbered stock which Defendant may have in said Utah
Power and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts.
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3,

The Defendant is awarded one-half of

the unencumbered stock which he may have in said Utah Power
and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts•
4.

Plaintiff shall be responsible to pay

any tax on her share of that stock when it is withdrawn and
delivered to her and the Defendant shall be required to assume
and pay any taxes on his share of the unencumbered stock when
same is withdrawn and delivered to him.
E.

The

childrens'

savings

accounts

are

awarded to the party who has custody of the child to be used
for the use and benefit of the child.
F.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Desertview

credit union account in the sum of approximately FOUR THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE ($4,461.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is
awarded

the

approximately

IRA

account

FIVE

at

Allstate

THOUSAND

ONE

in

the

HUNDRED

sum

of

FORTY-THREE

($5,143.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is ordered to immediately
cash in the Allstate insurance policy and obtain the cash
value of same and deliver one-half of said amount, together
with verification of said amount, to the Plaintiff forthwith.
That any tax consequences associated with cashing the IRAs
should be divided equally between the parties.
G.

With

respect

to

the

life

insurance

policies on the lives of the minor children, those policies
are awarded to the parent who has that child in his or her
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custody. If that custodial parent wishes to continue the
policy, then said custodial parent shall be responsible to pay
for any premiums on the childrens' policies,
H.

The Plaintiff is awarded the 1986 Jeep,

the 1980 Buick and the 1978 Dodge Van, free and clear of all
claims of the Defendant. The Defendant is awarded the 1979
Mercedes, the 1979 Ford truck, the 1981 Yamaha and the 1983
three wheeler, free and clear of all claims of the Plaintiff.
I.

The Plaintiff is awarded the furniture,

fixtures and appliances located in the home of the parties,
with the exception of the following items which the Court
awards to the Defendant:
1.

All of Defendant's personal items and

the furniture and fixtures in the home that were exclusively
used by Omeid, together with all of Omeid's personal effects
including the Nintendo.
2.
furniture

equipment,

The Defendant is awarded his office
his

tools,

his

stereo,

the

Epson

computer, the non-remote control television set, the camera
and projector, the family room set with the fold out queen
size bed and love seat.
3.

The Defendant is awarded one-third

of all bedding, linens, towels, cooking utensils and cooking
hardware.
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4.

The Defendant is awarded the shotgun,

the 357 Magnum, and the two .22 Rifles. The Plaintiff is
awarded the 30 06 Rifle and the .22 pistol.
5.

The Defendant is awarded the red and

blue 13' x 9' persian carpet and one red and blue 2' x 3'
persian carpet. The Plaintiff is awarded the two red persian
carpets, each approximately 3' x 6', one red and blue persian
carpet approximately 3' x 6' and one persian carpet that is
approximately 2' x 5'.
6.

The Court awards all of the jewelry

to the Plaintiff that she now has in her possession which
consists of the diamond ring consisting of two three-quarter
carat diamonds with small diamonds that were a gift to her as
a Mother's Day present, which has a value of $4,000.00, the
one and one-half carat ruby ring, which has a value of
approximately $1,000.00, and the wedding band with diamonds,
which has a value of approximately $800.00, and two gold
chains that are worth approximately $250.00, and three charms
worth approximately $75.00.
She is also awarded her wedding ring, which is
a three-quarter carat diamond with several small diamonds,
having a value of $4,500.00, and her engagement ring which is
one-half

carat

diamond

with

several

small

diamonds

surrounding, which has a value of $1,500.00. These rings were
gifts to her and are treated as her sole property.
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The Defendant is awarded the jewelry that he
has in his possession except for the items above that are
awarded to the Plaintiff, and the gold lion ring that is in
the possession of the Plaintiff, which has an approximate
value of $800.00. Some of the items that he has in his
possession consist of: diamond earrings, which have a value
of approximately $2,500.00, gold coin on a thick chain, which
has a value of approximately $3,000.00, a gold ID bracelet,
which has a value of approximately $2,000.00, a diamond
necklace, which has a value of approximately $2,800.00, a gold
ring with a large red stone having a value of approximately
$1,500.00, a diamond ring .50 carats, which has a value of
$1,200.00,

nine

gold

charms,

which

have

a

value

of

approximately $2,200.00, a two carat oval diamond ring having
a

value

of

approximately

$4,500.00, two

necklaces with

religious inscription having a value of approximately $800.00,
and all other miscellaneous gold coins and charms that he now
has in his possession.
The Court will- order that the parties exchange the
jewelry items within fifteen (15) days of the date of the
signing of the Decree.
7.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

debts and obligations and said debts and obligations are
allocated as follows:
A*

The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay

the following:
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Visa

$2200.00

Mastercard

$1700.00

ZCMI

$ 243.28

Nordstrom

$ 880.00

Weinstock

$ 750.00

Sears

$1000.00

Discover

$1400.00

Visa

$1300.00

J C Penney

$ 250.00

Mervins

$ 350.00

B.

The Defendant is ordered to assume and pay

all other family debts not specifically provided for herein.
8.

The

Defendant

may

have

accumulated

some

retirement benefits with Utah Power & Light which exist
separate and apart from the stock account which the parties
have acquired. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of any such
retirement benefits which may exist and which have been
accumulated during the period of the marriage and the Court
orders that an appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order
be entered dividing any such retirement benefits which may
have been accumulated with Utah Power and Light equally
between each of the parties hereto.
9.

The Court orders that the Defendant assist the

Plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and benefits if
the Plaintiff desires those benefits, provided that Plaintiff

27

pay the necessary premium payment that would be required in
order to obtain same.
10.

The Court finds that each party should be

ordered to maintain all available medical, dental and/or
optical insurance for the minor children if such insurance is
available to the party as a benefit of their employment. Each
party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonable and
necessary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred on
behalf of the minor children which are not covered by a policy
of insurance.
11.

Based

upon

the

Plaintiff's

voluntarily

agreement, expressed in Open Court, the Court orders that the
Plaintiff sign such documents as may be necessary to allow the
Defendant to claim the three (3) minor children in Plaintiff's
custody as Defendant's tax exemptions

on his

income tax

returns and that Defendant be allowed to continue to claim
said deductions until such time as the Plaintiff has obtained
full time employment. In the event the Plaintiff obtains full
time employment, then the Court orders that the Plaintiff be
allowed to claim the two youngest children as her dependents
on her income tax returns and that the Defendant be allowed
to claim the two oldest children as his tax dependents on his
income tax returns. In the event that the Plaintiff is not
willing to sign the necessary documents, as voluntarily agreed
herein, the Court will, upon petition by the Defendant,
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reconsider the amount of alimony that the Court has ordered
herein.
12.

The

Court

orders

that

Defendant's

legal

insurance benefits available through his employment are to be
divided

equally between the parties hereto. After equal

application of the insurance proceeds, each party is ordered
to assume and pay the balance of their respective Court costs
and attorney fees.
13.

The Plaintiff

is entitled

to an Order to

Withhold and Deliver pursuant to State law to be held in the
file in the event that the Defendant should become more than
thirty (30) days past due in his child support.
14.

That the Plaintiff is ordered not to associate

with RYAN MCGAVIN at any time^
DATED this

/ £/

day of January, 1990.

-*- CW

BOYD BUNNELL •
D i s t r i c t Court. J u d g e
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TAUNA LEE TIZPA,
Plaintiff,
Vs.

]
)
;
;

DECREE OF DIVORCE

i Civil No. 15776

AKBAR TIZPA,
Defendant.

]

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
trial before the Court on the 14th and 15th days of September,
1989, the Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge, presiding;
and the Plaintiff having appeared personally and with her
counsel, JOANE

PAPPAS WHITE; and,

the

Defendant

having

appeared personally and with his counsel, SHARON DONOVAN; and,
the Court having heard sworn testimony and having received
exhibits for and on behalf of each of the parties and having
taken this matter under advisement and having entered the
foregoing

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions

of Law now,

therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:

1.

That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from

the Defendant and u*e Defendant is granted a divorce from the
Plaintiff.
2.
the minor

That the Plaintiff is awarded the custody of

daughters

of

the

parties,

namely,

CARESHMEH,

CAMELLIA and AZITA. That the Defendant is awarded the custody
of the parties minor son, OMEID. That each party shall have
the right to reasonable visitation with the children in the
other parties' custody, including but not limited to, the
following visitation rights:
A.

That the non-custodial parent shall be

allowed to visit with the children in the custody of the other
parent at all reasonable times and that the Defendant be
allowed to take the children every other weekend from 10:00
a.m. on Saturday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The Plaintiff
shall be allowed to take OMEID every other weekend from
Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.it
B.

The Court further orders that the children

shall be allowed to go to their karate lessons with the
Defendant if the particular child wishes to do so.
3.

That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the

Plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX ($266.00) DOLLARS
ner month for each of the three (3) children in Plaintiff's
stody, commenci*

.Fith the month of October, 1989. Said

child support shal^ . J payable at the rate of one-half of said
support on or before the 15th of the month and one-half ui
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said support on or before the last day of the month and said
support shall continue on the same schedule each and every
month thereafter.
4.

That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the

Plaintiff the sum of SIX HUNDRED ($600.00) DOLLARS per month
for and as alimony, commencing with the month of October,
1989. Said alimony shall be payable at the rate of one-half
of said sum on or before the 15th of the month and one-half
of said sum on or before the last day of the month, said
alimony to terminate upon the Defendant's death or upon the
Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with an adult male who
is not a relative.. That such alimony award is permanent until
such time as a material change of circumstances occurs.
5.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

real and personal property during this marriage and said
property is awarded as follows:
A.

The home of the parties, together with the

adjacent lot, is to be placed in the names of the parties as
tenants in common. The Plaintiff shall have the right to the
exclusive use of said property for herself and the three (3)
minor children in her custody until such time as she vacates
the property, remarries, or until the youngest child in her
care and custody reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, at
which time the Court orders that the property be sold and the
net equity received from the sale divided equally between the
parties hereto. Until the home property is sold, the Court

orders that the Plaintiff be required to pay the taxes and
insurance on said property and be responsible to take care of
the necessary repairs and maintenance and keep the property
in a reasonable state suitable for habitation.
B.

All of the other real estates properties

owned by these parties shall be placed in the names of the
parties

hereto

as

tenants

in

common

and

each

of said

properties shall be immediately listed for sale and upon the
sale of each of said properties, the net proceeds therefrom
shall be divided equally between the parties. Until said
properties are sold, the Defendant shall be entitled to all
of the income from the properties and shall be obligated to
pay all of the mortgage payments, taxes, insurance and upkeep
on said properties and he shall have the exclusive use of same
and the right to manage same until a sale is obtained for each
of said properties. In the event that the Defendant wishes to
keep the karate studio, the Court orders that he should be
allowed to do so provided that he immediately pays to the
Plaintiff a sum equal to one-half of the current appraised
value, said appraised value to be determined by two (2)
appraisers, one (1) on which is to be selected by each of the
parties hereto.
C.

Each party is ordered to be responsible

to pay one-half of any debt which may be ov/ed to Plaintiff's
father when and if that debt is ever established as an actual
legal obligation.
4

D.

With respect to Defendant's Utah Power and

Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts, said accounts are awarded
as follows:
1.

The Defendant is awarded that portion

of the stock which is encumbered by a loan in the sum of
approximately TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS, provided that
the Defendant assume and pays the outstanding encumbrance
thereon and holds the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
2.

The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of

all unencumbered stock which Defendant may have in said Utah
Power and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts.
3.

The Defendant is awarded one-half of

the unencumbered stock which he may have in said Utah Power
and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts.
4.

Plaintiff shall be responsible to pay

any tax on her share of that stock when it is withdrawn and
delivered to her and the Defendant shall be required to assume
and pay any taxes on his share of the unencumbered stock when
same is withdrawn and delivered to him.
E.

The

childrens'

savings

accounts

are

awarded to the party who has custody of the child to be used
for the use and benefit of the child.
F.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Desertview

credit uniop account in the sum of approximately FOUR THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE ($4,461.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is
awarded

the

IRA

account

at

Allstate

in

the

sum

of

approximately

FIVE

THOUSAND

ONE

HUNDRED

FORTY-THREE

($5,143.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is ordered to immediately
cash in the Allstate insurance policy and obtain the cash
value of same and deliver one-half of said amount, together
with verification of said amount, to the Plaintiff forthwith.
That any tax consequences associated with cashing the IRAs
should be divided equally between the parties.
G.

With

respect

to

the

life

insurance

policies on the lives of the minor children, those policies
are awarded to the parent who has that child in his or her
custody. If that custodial parent wishes to continue the
policy# then said custodial parent shall be responsible to pay
for any premiums on the childrens' policies.
H.

The Plaintiff is awarded the 1986 Jeep,

the 1980 Buick and the 1978 Dodge Vanf free and clear of all
claims of the Defendant. The Defendant is awarded the 1979
Mercedes, the 1979 Ford truck, the 1981 Yamaha and the 198 3
three wheeler, free and clear of all claims of the Plaintiff.
I.

The Plaintiff is awarded the furniture,

fixtures and appliances located in the home of the parties,
with the exception of the following items which the Court
awards to the Defendant:
1.

All of Defendants personal items and

the furniture and fixtures in the home that were exclusively
used by Omeid, together with all of Omeid's personal effects
including the Nintendo.
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2.
furniture

equipment,

The Defendant is awarded his office
his

tools,

his

stereo,

the

Epson

computer, the non-remote control television set, the camera
and projector, the family room set with the fold out queen
size bed and love seat.
3.

The Defendant is awarded one-third

of all bedding, linens, towels, cooking utensils and cooking
hardware.
4.

The Defendant is awarded the shotgun,

the 357 Magnum, and the two .22 Rifles. The Plaintiff is
awarded the 30 06 Rifle and the .22 pistol.
5.

The Defendant is awarded the red and

blue 13' x 9' persian carpet and one red and blue 2' x 3'
persian carpet. The Plaintiff is awarded the two red persian
carpets, each approximately 3' x 6', one red and blue persian
carpet approximately 3' x 6' and one persian carpet that is
approximately 2' x 5'.
6.

The Court awards all of the jewelry

to the Plaintiff that she now has in her possession which
consists of the diamond ring consisting of two three-quarter
carat diamonds with small diamonds that were a gift to her as
a Mother's Day present, which has a value of $4,000.00, the
one and one-half carat

ruby ring, which has a value of

approximately $1,000.00, and the wedding band with diamonds,
which has a value of approximately $800.00, and two gold
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chains that are worth approximately $250.00, and three charms
worth approximately $75.00.
She is also awarded her wedding ring, which is
a three-quarter carat diamond with several small diamonds,
having a value of $4,500.00, and her engagement ring which is
one-half

carat

diamond

with

several

small

diamonds

surrounding, which has a value of $1,500.00. These rings were
gifts to her and are treated as her sole property.
The Defendant is awarded the jewelry that he
has in his possession except for the items above that are
awarded to the Plaintiff, and the gold lion ring that is in
the possession of the nlaintiff, which has an approximate
value of $800.00. Some of the items that he has in his
possession consist of: diamond earrings, which have a value
of approximately $2,500.00, gold coin on a thick chain, which
has a value of approximately $3,000.00, a gold ID bracelet,
which has a value of approximately

$2,000.00, a diamond

necklace, which has a value of approximately $2,800.00, a gold
ring with a large red stone having a value of approximately
$1,500.00, a diamond ring .50 carats, which has a value of
$1,200.00,

nine

gold

charms,

which

have

a

value

of

approximately $2,200.00, a two carat oval diamond ring having
a

value

of

approximately

$4,500.00,

two

necklaces

with

religious inscription having a value of approximately $800.00,
and all other miscellaneous gold coins and charms that he now
has in his possession.
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The Court will order that the parties exchange the
jewelry items within fifteen (15) days of the date of the
signing of the Decree.
7.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

debts and obligations and said debts and obligations are
allocated as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay

the following:
Visa

$2200.00

Mastercard

$1700.00

ZCMI

$ 243.28

Nordstrom

$ 880.00

Weinstock

$ 750.00

Sears

$1000.00

Discover

$1400.00

Visa

$1300.00

J C Penney

$ 250.00

Mervins

$ 350.00

B.

The Defendant is ordered to assume and pay

all other family debts not specifically provided for herein.
8.

The

Defendant

may

have

accumulated

some

retirement benefits with Utah Power & Light which exist
separate and apart from the stock account which the parties
have acquired. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of any such
retirement benefits which may exist and which have been
accumulated during the period of the marriage and the Court
9

orders that an appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order
be entered dividing any such retirement benefits which may
have been accumulated with Utah Power and Light equally
between each of the parties hereto.
9.

The Court orders that the Defendant assist the

Plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and benefits if
the Plaintiff desires those benefits, provided that Plaintiff
pay the necessary premium payment that would be required in
order to obtain same.
10.

Based

upon

the

Plaintiff's

voluntarily

agreement, expressed in Open Court, the Court orders that the
Plaintiff sign such documents as may be necessary to allow the
Defendant to claim the three (3) minor children in Plaintiff's
custody as Defendant's tax exemptions on his income tax
returns and that Defendant be allowed to continue to claim
said deductions until such time as the Plaintiff has obtained
full time employment. In the event the Plaintiff obtains full
time employment, then the Court orders that the Plaintiff be
allowed to claim the two youngest children as her dependents
on her income tax returns and that the Defendant be allowed
to claim the two oldest children as his tax dependents on his
income tax returns. In the event that the Plaintiff is not
willing to sign the necessary documents, as voluntarily agreed
herein, the Court will, upon petition by the Defendant,
reconsider the amount of alimony that the Court has ordered
herein.
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11.

The Court

finds that

each party shall be

ordered to maintain all available medical, dental and/or
optical insurance

for the minor children if such insurance

is available to the party as a benefit of their employment.
Each party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonable and
necessary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred on
behalf of the minor children which are not covered by a policy
of insurance.
12.

The

Court

orders

that

Defendant's

legal

insurance benefits available through his employment are to be
divided

equally

between the parties hereto. After equal

application of the insurance proceeds, each party is ordered
to assume and pay the balance of their respective Court costs
and attorney fees.
13.

The Plaintiff

is entitled

to an Order to

Withhold and Deliver pursuant to State law to be held in the
file in the event that the Defendant should become more than
thirty (30) days past due in his child support.
14.

That the Plaintiff is ordered not to associate

with RYAN MCGAVIN at any time.
DATED this /f/

- day of January, 1990.

ADDENDUM M C W
Order on Order to Show Cause

Srvr?;7i: r.I57n'C7 COURT

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza
475 East Main - Suite 1
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAUNA LEE TIZPA,
]i
;

Plaintiff,
Vs.
AKBAR TIZPA,

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

i

Defendant.

Civil N o . 15776

'

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before

the Court on

Boyd

Bunnell,
appeared

WHITE;

and,

the

received

advisement

and

Plaintiff

has

and

Defendant

testimony,

March

Judge,

personally

counsel, SHARON

dated

30th day

District

having

his

the

31,

exhibits

never

and

the

worked

marriage

time
Court

and

and

operates

having

having
a

further

found

the

a

of

children
that

school
that

Plaintiff

the

and

the

matter

under

found

home

the
is a

has

the
been

throughout
works

evenings;
strong

Decision
that

and

Defendant

with
sworn

Memorandum

having

PAPPAS

heard

of the parties

in

Honorable

JOANE

having

taken

the

there

the

personally

Written
Court

the

counsel,

Court

having

outside

found

Karate

her

and,

appeared

and

the primary caretaker of the
the

with

and,

entered

1989;

presiding;

having

DONOVAN;

having

of March, 1989 f

and,

bond

of

full
the
af-
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fection between the Plaintiff
boy, OMEID; and, the Court
indiscretion

in

being

and the children except for the

having

involved

found

that

the

with a sixteen

Plaintiff's

(16) year old

boy has caused OMEID to develope a certain amount of animosity
against his mother; and

having

found that

said

condition may

be somewhat nutured by statements and actions of the Defendant;
and having been fully advised in the premises now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That it is in the best interests

of

the three

(3) minor daughters of the parties that they remain with their
mother and, therefore, the temporary custody of the three
minor girls of this marriage
Plaintiff herein.

(3)

is awarded to their mother, the

The Court finds that it is in the best interest

of the minor son of the parties that he remain in the temporary
custody

of

the

Defendant

during

the pendency

of

this action

and, therefore, the Defendant is awarded the temporary custody
of the minor son, OMEID.
2.
with

It is ordered

RYAN McGAVIN at any

that the Plaintiff

not

time when the children

associate

are present

and, further, that the Plaintiff not allow Mr. McGavin to be
in the parties home at any time and, further, that the Plaintiff
not supply him with money or presents.
3. . The Court

further

orders that

the

non-cusvodial

parent shall be allowed to visit with the children in the custody
of the other parent at all reasonable times and that the DoiVndant
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be allowed to take the children every other weekend from 10:00
a.m. on Saturday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday commencing with the
weekend

of April

8r

1989.

The Plaintiff will be allowed to

take OMEID every other weekend from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until
Sunday at 6:00 p.m. commencing with the weekend of April 15f
1989.
4.
be allowed

The Court further orders that the children shall
to go to their karate lessons with the Defendant

if the particular child wishes to do so.
5.
from
or

The Court

threatening,

orders

harassing,

that each party be restrained

or

from malcing any derogatory

interfering

with

the

other,

statements about the other in

the presence of the childrenr and each party is restrained from
incurring

any

further

debt

or

from disposing

of any marital

assets.
6.

The Court finds

that the Defendant has a gross

income from his salary at Utah Power and Light of approximately
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY ($4,170.00) DOLLARS per month
and that he has other income

from his Karate School that is

used to pay mortgage payments on the real property investments
made by the parties; therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant
can pay and the Plaintiff will reasonably need, to assist her
with the support of the three
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE
further

need

(3) children, the total sum of

($775.00) DOLLARS and that she will

temporary .alimony

in

the

sum

of

FIVE

HUNDRED
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($500.00) DOLLARS per month.
pay said

sums to the

It is ordered that the Defendant

Plaintiff

in semi-monthly

installments,

one-half of said total being due on or before the 15th day of
April, 1989 and the other half on or before the last day of
April, 1989 and that said payments continue in this manner until
further order of this Court.
7.
use

of

The

Court

the parties

awards

residence

the

for

Plaintiff

herself

and

the

exclusive

the three

(3)

children in her care and further grants her the use of the 1986
Jeep Cherokee automobile.
the Buick

automobile

in

The
good

Defendant
running

is ordered

condition

and

to place
to allow

the Plaintiff to have the use of that vehicle as well.
8.

The

Court

orders

that

the

Plaintiff

have

the

exclusive use of the furniture and fixtures located in the home
except that the Defendant will be allowed to take his VCR, his
files and tools, his waterbed, OMEID'S Nintendo games and tapes
and stereo, and the Defendant will be allowed to keep the television

and

computer

that

he now has in his possession.

Defendant shall be allowed

The

the use of the Mercedes automobile

during the pendency of this action.
9.

The

Plaintiff

is

ordered

to

make

payments

on

the debts listed on her Financial Statement and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom.

The Defendant is ordered to make the mortgage

payments on the investment properties belonging to the parties.
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10.
attorney's

The

fees

Plaintiff
and,

has

no

therefore,

the

funds

from

Court

which

orders

to pay

that

the

Defendant pay to the Plaintiff for the use and benefit of her
attorney, the sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

($250.00) DOLLARS and

that said payment be made on or before May 15, 1989.

The Court

further orders that the parties divide any money available to
them by way of legal fee insurance benefits equally.
11.

The Court finds that neither of the parties hereto

have a legal obligation to support the Plaintiff's neice who
is currently residing with the Plaintiff and the child support
and alimony awarded herein do not consider any money spent for
the support of the Plaintiff's neice.
12.
to

perform

The

Court

psychological

hereby

appoints

evaluations

Dr.

on the

Grant
parties

B.

Smith

and

the

children and to conduct a home study and to make his findings
available to the Court and counsel.
DATED this <^%^day of April, 1989.

JUNNEL
:rict Court Judfre
APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT:

SHARON DONOVAN
Attorney for Defendant

